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Abstract
One of the key problems of many sociological regression models is their modest explanatory 
power. This has not only to do with the insufficient development of the underlying theories 
but also with the free will of the concerned social actors, which manifests itself in irrational, 
spontaneous, and sometimes even arbitrary decisions. The foreign and economic policy 
of the US government under Donald Trump is an excellent example of this source of 
indeterminacy.
An alternative and more promising approach is an explanation of the constraints of 
social behaviour by the unequal distribution of power resources and the competing interests 
of the actors concerned. This approach requires, on the one hand, enough observational 
data which include cases that reached the analysed constraints. On the other hand, there 
is a need for statistical procedures which estimate and explain these constraints. Assuming 
that sufficient amounts of data are available, this paper proposes the use of sequential OLS 
regressions, which eliminate step by step non-critical observations in order to identify the 
cases that reached the mentioned constraints.
For illustrative purposes, the author analyses the policy space of anti-democratic 
regimes with regard to their possibilities of curbing democracy. On the basis of the 
democracy scores of Freedom House, the author explores the governmental constraints 
set by (i) national civil societies and (ii) international NGOs for the promotion of political/
civil rights. The related sequential regressions allow for an assessment of how effective the 
different constraints are and how far democracy may deteriorate in the worst case under 
given structural conditions.
Key words: Policy constraints, OLS regression, International comparisons, Democratisation, 
Anti-democratic regimes.
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1. IntROduCtIOn And OvERvIEw
Regression models of social or economic behaviour are often based on unrealistic 
assumptions about the rationality and the emotional stability of the actors which 
they intend to describe. They yield regression lines and ex-post predictions, 
which typically neglect the actors’ free will, emotionality, and spontaneous shifts 
in preferences (Earman 1986: chap. 12). This problem is especially critical for 
analyses which are not focused on statistically aggregated behaviour of groups, 
but rather on decisions of particular actors. Consequently, these analyses often 
have only limited explanatory power (see e.g. Hibbs (1973: chap. 6) about the 
behaviour of political elites). Moreover, they are generally hard to cross-validate 
with data from similar samples, which is currently discussed as the so-called 
replication crisis of the social sciences (Hughes 2018: chap. 1; Schmidt 2017).
In view of this unsatisfactory situation, the present article promotes an 
alternative approach: it proposes to analyse possible instead of real decision-
making behaviour. In this article, possible behaviour is assumed to be constrained 
by the power and the interests of other actors. This assumption promises ex-post 
forecasts, which are more reliable and robust because they depend not only on the 
arbitrary plans of one but of several actors with contradictory interests. Moreover, 
it adds to the explanation of social behaviour by teleological/final causation (Stout 
1996: chap. 3; Schueler 2003: chap. 3) another important element: constraints by 
the power and will of others, which make for the analysed actor certain forms of 
behaviour impossible (Mueller 2012). It is obvious that this approach also requires 
new statistical techniques in order to estimate the mentioned behavioural constraints 
from the available observational data. For this purpose, we propose in this article a 
sequential regression procedure which excludes step by step all observations that 
are not sufficiently close to the analyzed constraint-line (see section 3, Fig. 3). At 
the end of this elimination process the only observations remaining are those which 
represent the focused constraint and these can consequently be used to identify it.
In order to illustrate this constraint-approach as well as its methodological 
implications, the article analyses the policy space of governments with regard 
to the curbing of democratic freedom, which is described by time series of the 
political rights index (PR) of Freedom House (2017) for ca. 180 countries and 
territories. Two types of constraints of this policy space are considered: political 
protests of the national civil society and trade or consumer boycotts organized or 
induced by international NGOs. Both constraints together define the governmental 
policy space, which can be used for forecasts about future democratic freedom. 
The two constraints may, however, also be compared with regard to their relative 
importance. The related empirical analyses reveal that neither are very effective, 
especially if the political rights of the civil society are already restricted by an 
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authoritarian government. However, civil society is generally more important than 
international NGOs, except in countries with strongly authoritarian regimes and 
high trade dependency, for which our empirical analyses show that international 
NGOs are more effective than civil society.
2. A MOdEL Of thE GOvERnMEntAL POLICy SPACE: thE CASE  
Of POLItICAL fREEdOM
This article is based on the hypothesis that democracy is a universal value, which 
triggers the expectations of many actors, hoping for increased political freedom in 
terms of popular participation in the political decision-making process. One of these 
collective actors is the national civil society, which is directly concerned by any 
change of its political system. Its weapons for defending democracy are political 
protests, votes for or against the ruling government, etc. Another important actor 
is the international community of NGOs, which aims at promoting democracy 
and human rights on a global scale, e.g. by inducing economic sanctions by the 
UN, international trade boycotts, etc. This second, international group includes 
Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, etc.
The expectation Ei of any of these groups i with regard to the political freedom 
F+ at a future point in time is assumed to be guided by the following three principles, 
which together represent our hypothesis 1:
a) If the current political freedom F is at the lowest possible level F = Fmin, the 
group i expects an increase of freedom by a positive basic expectation bi. Thus
If F = Fmin → Ei = Fmin + bi
where bi > 0 (1a)
b) If the current political freedom F is at the highest possible level F = Fmax, the 
expectations of group i are already fulfilled, since freedom cannot be increased 
anymore. Thus
If F = Fmax → Ei = Fmax (1b)
c) All other cases are treated by linear interpolation between situations (a) and (b). 
Thus
Ei = F + ∆
where ∆ = bi * (Fmax - F)/(Fmax - Fmin) (1c)
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As Fig. 1 demonstrates, the expectation Ei about the future freedom F+ increases 
with the current level of freedom F, whereas the gap ∆ between F and the expectation 
Ei decreases with the current level of freedom F.
In principle, the level of future freedom F+ can deviate by a factor Di from 
the expectation Ei of a group I; however, only as much as the tolerance Ti of the 
group with regard to the violation of its interests permits. Hence, we postulate as 
hypothesis 2:
Di = (Ei - F+) / Ei ≤ Ti , for all groups i (2)
Thus, there are possible choices of freedom F+ and impossible ones. The latter would 
create so many deprivations (Gurr 2010: chap. 2) that government risks revolutionary 
violence (Davies 1972) or harsh international trade sanctions (Cleveland 2015). It 
is important to note that for possible choices all inequalities of equation (2) must 
be fulfilled. Hence, each group has a “veto” against the choice of F+ if it violates 
its expectations Ei in an intolerable way. This motivates the research interest in 
identifying the most important among the different groups, which represents the 
critical constraint of the governmental policy space. The answer to this question 
depends on the relative effectiveness of the different groups in defending their 
expectations, which has to be explored by empirical analyses (see section 6).
Regarding the tolerance Ti, there are many different factors, like political 
traditions, authoritarian culture, etc., which could be taken into consideration. 
 
bi
Freedom F
Freedom F+
Expectation
Ei 
F min
F min F max
F max
E i = F+Δ
F
F+ = F
Δ
fig. 1: The hypothetical relation between the current polit. freedom F and the expecta-
tion Ei about the polit. freedom F+ at a future point in time
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However, for analysing which of the governmental policies are really possible, the 
most important of these factors is, according to section 1, the political power Pi 
that can be used by the group i against a governmental decision: the more power Pi 
the group i has, the smaller its tolerance for deviance from its expectations. Thus, 
we postulate as hypothesis 3:
Ti = ki + ci * Pi , 
where ki > 0 and ci  < 0 (3)
The combination of the equations (2) and (3) yields the condition for possible 
choices of the future freedom F+:
Di = (Ei - F+) / Ei ≤ ki + ci * Pi = Ti (4)
If condition (4) is violated, the related decision about F+ is impossible, as indicated 
in Fig. 2. Thus, there is a constraint Ci for possible decisions about F+, which can 
be derived from equation (4) 1) and leads to the following hypothesis 4:
Ci = Ei * (1 - ki - ci * Pi) ≤ F+ (5)
Since ci < 0, the constraint line Ci increases with the power Pi and, consequently, 
narrows the governmental policy space of possible decisions if the group i becomes 
more powerful (see Fig. 2).
fig. 2: The hypothetical relations between the power Pi, the tolerance Ti, and the 
resulting constraint Ci
Power Pi
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3. OPERAtIOnALISAtIOnS And EStIMAtIOnS fOR tEStInG thE MOdEL
For empirical tests of the previous hypotheses 1 – 4, most of the theoretical 
concepts of section 2 have to be measured or estimated for two groups of actors i, 
i.e. the national civil society (i = nat) and the international community of NGOs (i 
= int), which aim at promoting democracy.
The most important variables to be operationalised are freedom F and F+. We 
are using for this purpose the political rights index PR of Freedom House (2017).2) 
It is a complex democracy index 3), which is often cited by UN-agencies and the 
World Bank (Giannone 2010: 75-76) as well as the daily news media. Nonetheless, 
for this article the index PR has two major drawbacks: first, in the short run it 
doesn’t change too much and second, it has a polarity which is the reverse of 
political freedom. Thus, we focused on a 5-year interval with more change and 
inverted its polarity such that
F  = F_2011 = 8 - (Polit. Rights PR in 2011) (6a)
F+ = F_2016 = 8 - (Polit. Rights PR in 2016) (6b)
From the definitions of the original PR-indicators it follows that Fmin = 1 and Fmax = 7.
The measurement of the expectations Ei = Enat and Ei = Eint is much more 
difficult. According to the equations (1a-c), they depend on one single parameter, 
i.e. the basic expectation bi. Thus, we used different working hypotheses about 
possible values of bi and finally selected the one with the best fit r
2 between the 
theoretical and the real tolerance for deviance Ti (see Fig. 3). In this way we 
achieved the best possible statistical estimate of Ei and implicitly determined the 
values of the deviances
Di = (Ei - F+) / Ei (7)
As postulated by hypothesis 3, the maximum possible deviance Ti depends on 
the power Pi of the national civil society (i=nat) and the international community 
of NGOs (i=int), which also had to be operationalised in order to enable empirical 
tests. The power of the international NGOs over the government of a particular 
target country is very much influenced by its trade dependency. The more dependent 
the country is on international trade, the more vulnerable it is to boycotts, either 
organised by governments or consumer movements (Hufbauer et al. 2009: 62). 
Thus, we operationalised the power
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Pint = 100 * (Foreign trade in 2011) / (GDP in 2011) = TradeDep_2011 (8a)
by making use of the trade dependency data which the World Bank (2019) has 
published for the year 2011. 
The power of the national civil society in relation to its government is mainly 
influenced by its political rights. The more political rights, the better the chances 
of forcing a government out of office, e.g. by democratic elections or massive 
political protest (Hibbs 1973: 112). Thus, we operationalised the power
Pnat = F_2011 = 8 - (Polit. Rights PR in 2011)  (8b)
where PR is the political rights index of Freedom House (2017).
According to equations (3) and (4), the deviance Di is limited by the tolerance 
Ti such that the following inequality holds for both groups, i.e. i = nat and i = int:
Di ≤ Ti = ki + ci * Pi (9)
Legend:  Dependent variable: Deviance Di; Independent variable: Power Pi; Sample for f1: all Di ≥ 0; Sample 
for f2: all Di, excl. neg. residuals of f1; Sample for f3: all Di, excl. neg. residuals of f1 and f2; Sample for fn: all Di, 
excl. neg. residuals of f1,.., fn-1.
fig. 3: The estimation of the tolerance for deviance Ti and the related parameters ki 
and ci by successive linear regressions.
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Assuming that bi, Ei, Di, and Pi are all known, either by measurement or 
plausible working hypotheses, the tolerance Ti and the related parameters ki and 
ci could be estimated by the following iterative process, which is visualised in 
Fig. 3 and described in an earlier article by the author (Mueller 2012: 82). It is a 
special form of the iteratively reweighted least squares technique (Rubin 1983; 
Andersen 2008: 52 ff.) and starts with a conventional OLS regression, where Y = 
Di is the dependent and X = Pi the independent variable. Since we are interested in 
violations of expectations, Y is restricted to cases where Di ≥ 0. After removing the 
non-critical observations below the regression line f1(X) with negative residuals, 
the remaining data are used for a second regression analysis 4), which yields 
the regression line f2(X). Since we are mainly interested in the highest possible 
deviances Di for a given value X = Pi, we have to remove all cases with negative 
residuals below the line f2(X). By repeating this process of estimating regression 
lines fj(X) and subsequently removing the related negative residuals, the process 
finally converges to the upper margin of the data cloud, which corresponds to the 
tolerance Ti. It is recommended that this process is stopped after a rather limited 
number of n regressions such that the final regression equation fn(X) is calculated 
with ca. 10% of the original data points. In this way ca. 10% / 2 = 5% 5) of all Di are 
in so far “rare” observations as they are beyond the limit Ti. As mentioned earlier, 
this regression procedure can be repeated for different working hypotheses about 
the basic expectation bi and the associated Ei and Di. By choosing the bi with the 
best final r2, sequential regression also yielded estimates for Ei (see eqns. (1a–c)) 
and Di (see eqn. (7)).
4. thE EStIMAtIOn Of thE nAtIOnAL COnStRAIntS
By means of the previous sequential regression procedure it is possible to estimate 
the tolerance Tnat (see hypothesis 3) of the national civil society
Tnat = knat + cnat * Pnat = knat + cnat * F_2011, 
where knat > 0 and cnat  < 0 (10)
as well as the related constraint (see eqn. (5)) 
Cnat = Enat * (1 - knat - cnat * F_2011) (11)
We ran this estimation process for different plausible working hypotheses about 
the expectations Enat and the associated parameter bnat, which were systematically 
varied between bnat = 0 and bnat = 3. Tab. 1 presents the best fitting results of these 
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trials. By comparing the adjusted r2 of the final models A4, B4, and C4, it turns 
out that bnat = 2.00 (see model B4) yields the best correspondence between model 
and data. Thus, for F_2011=Fmin=1, the national civil society expects an increase 
of freedom to F+ = Fmin + 2 = 3 (see eqn. (1a)). Moreover, as hypothesised in 
equation (10), knat > 0 and cnat  < 0 have the theoretically expected signs. They are 
statistically highly significant and consequently give the final model B4 a high 
explanatory power with an adjusted r2=0.899. The related Fig. 4a seems to confirm 
the importance of the resulting constraint Cnat. A comparison with Fig. 4b illustrates 
the superiority of the presented approach of explaining the possible instead of the 
real governmental behaviour: Fig. 4b visualises for the same data cloud as Fig. 
4a a conventional regression analysis with bnat = 2.00, which corresponds to the 
model B1 of Tab. 1. However, the regression line of Fig. 4b has an explanatory 
power adj. r2 of only 0.718 instead of 0.899 (see Tab. 1) and displays the lower 
determinacy of the behavioural forecast, which is due to many high residuals that 
were intentionally excluded when calculating the model B4.
tab. 1: Parameter estimation of the national tolerance for deviance Tnat
Sequential
model
Basic
exp. bnat
Const.
knat
Coeff.
cnat
N
 abs.
N
 rel.
Adj.
r-sq.
A1 1.50 0.647*** -0.093*** 176 1.000 .725
A2 1.50 0.805*** -0.110*** 105 0.597 .899
A3 1.50 0.903*** -0.109*** 34 0.193 .826
A4 1.50 0.921*** -0.100*** 20 0.114 .882
B1 2.00 0.694*** -0.100*** 184 1.000 .718
B2 2.00 0.873*** -0.120*** 105 0.571 .921
B3 2.00 0.953*** -0.116*** 34 0.185 .854
B4 2.00 0.969*** -0.107*** 20 0.109 .899
C1 2.50 0.753*** -0.108*** 185 1.000 .761
C2 2.50 0.924*** -0.127*** 105 0.568 .933
C3 2.50 0.993*** -0.121*** 34 0.184 .874
C4 2.50 0.932*** -0.081*** 16 0.086 .868
Legend: Underlined: Final model for given bnat. Bold underlined: Best final model. One-tailed significances: ***: 
p ≤ .001, **: p ≤ .01, *: p ≤ .05 . N rel.: Relative sample size in comparison to the first model of a given bnat. Adj. 
r-sq.: Adjusted r-square = Fit of the model. Samples of the original models A1, B1, C1: Global full-samples, i.e. 
all countries and territories for which Freedom House (2017) has data. Dependent variable: Di. Restriction Di 
≥ 0. Independent variable: F_2011, which is sufficiently different from Di in order to avoid an autocorrelation 
(see eqns. (1c) and (7)).
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fig. 4a: Explaining the constraint Cnat of governmental behaviour by successive linear 
regressions 6)
fig. 4b: The classical approach: Explaining real governmental behaviour by ordinary 
linear regression 6), 7)
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5. thE EStIMAtIOn Of thE IntERnAtIOnAL COnStRAIntS
For the community of international NGOs there are mathematical expressions 
similar to the equations (10) and (11), which describe the effect of the power Pint of 
the international NGOs on their tolerance for deviance
Tint = kint + cint * Pint = kint + cint * TradeDep_2011, 
where kint > 0 and cint  < 0 (12)
as well as on their related constraint
Cint = Eint * (1 - kint - cint * TradeDep_2011) (13)
tab. 2: Parameter estimation of the international tolerance for deviance Tint
Sequential
model
Basic
exp. bint
Const.
kint
Coeff.
cint
N
abs.
N
 rel.
Adj.
r-sq.
A1 1.50 0.258***   -5.07*10-4 162 1.000 .005
A2 1.50 0.531***  -6.27*10-4 63 0.389 .026
A3 1.50 0.652***  -3.07*10-4 31 0.191 .001
A4 1.50 0.723*** -2.59*10-4 12 0.074 .147
B1 2.00 0.272*** -4.67*10-4 169 1.000 .003
B2 2.00 0.586*** -7.40*10-4 * 64 0.379 .040
B3 2.00 0.744*** -6.29*10-4 ** 28 0.166 .211
B4 2.00 0.765*** -4.31*10-4 ** 14 0.083 .463
C1 2.50 0.301***  -5.28*10-4 170 1.000 .004
C2 2.50 0.615*** -8.10*10-4 * 68 0.400 .042
C3 2.50 0.796*** -8.58*10-4 *** 29 0.171 .320
C4 2.50 0.779***      -3.53*10-4 ** 18 0.106 .339
Legend: Underlined: Final model for given bint. Bold underlined: Best final model. One-tailed significances:  
***: p ≤ .001, **: p ≤ .01, *: p ≤ .05 . N rel.: Relative sample size in comparison to the first model for a given bint. 
Adj. r-sq.: Adjusted r-square = Fit of the model. Samples of the original models A1, B1, C1: Global full-samples, 
i.e. all countries and territories, for which Freedom House (2017) has data. Dependent variable: Di. Restriction: 
Di ≥ 0. Independent variable: TradeDep_2011.
As in the previous section 4, sequential linear regression was used to estimate the 
parameters kint and cint for different working hypotheses about the basic expectation 
bint, which was systematically varied between the plausible limits bint = 0 and bint = 3. 
The best statistical results are given in Tab. 2 and show the highest values of r2 for 
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the final model B4. Like in Tab. 1, the basic expectation bint = 2.00, implying that 
the international NGOs expect for F_2011=Fmin=1 an increase of freedom to the 
level Fmin+2 = 3 (see eqn. (1a)). For the optimal model B4, the parameters kint and 
cint are both statistically significant and have the signs postulated in hypothesis 3, 
which is thus confirmed. However, the explanatory power r2 of this model is clearly 
smaller than the corresponding r2 = 0.899 of the power of the national civil society 
(see Tab. 1, model B4). This finding probably mirrors the relative weakness of the 
international NGOs concerned.
6. thE jOInt EffECtS Of thE nAtIOnAL And IntERnAtIOnAL 
COnStRAIntS
With the parameter estimates of the previous Tabs. 1 and 2 it is possible to quantify 
the constraints 
Ci = Ei * (1 - ki - ci * Pi) (5)
which are given by the national civil society (i=nat) and the international NGOs 
(i=int). As mentioned earlier, the chosen F+ must comply with both constraints and 
consequently has to fulfil the inequality
F+ ≥ max(Cnat , Cint) (14)
On the one hand, this expression allows predictions to be made about the future 
freedom F+. These predictions are less precise but more reliable and robust than 
the usual forecasts: the constraints which they are based on are given by the power 
of other interest groups. On the other hand, inequality (14) leads to the additional 
research question which of the two groups is more important for constraining the 
governmental decisions about future democratic freedom. The answer depends on 
the differences with regard to the power of the two groups. According to Fig. 5a, the 
NGOs are generally not strong enough to really influence governmental decisions. 
This confirms earlier investigations of Hufbauer et al. (2009: 159), where only 31% 
of all international sanctions lead to the intended regime change / democratisation. 
Conversely, national civil society is much more important, especially if political 
freedom is high. Only if the political freedom F_2011 and the related power Pnat 
of the national civil society are very limited and trade dependency is very high, 
are international NGOs important enough to constrain governmental policies (see 
Fig. 5b). However, also in this situation the influence of the NGOs is rather weak. 
This result is not so unexpected, as many recent trade boycotts had only limited 
success.
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fig. 5a: A synoptic view of the constraints Cnat and Cint of countries at all levels level of 
trade dependency TradeDep_2011 8)
fig. 5b: A synoptic view of the constraints Cnat and Cint of countries with high trade 
dependency TradeDep_2011 > 100 8)
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7. SuMMARy And COnCLuSIOnS
This article is a plea to look at possible instead of real behaviour. Sociological 
analysis generally focuses on the second type of behaviour, which, however, is often 
difficult to explain: social actors are in many situations irrational, emotional, and 
have unstable preferences and free will (Frank 2005; Berthoz 2006), which is often 
neglected in modern sociological analysis (Scheff 1992). Conversely, impossible 
behaviour constrained by the power and interests of significant others is much 
easier to model and has a higher reliability. Possible behaviour is complementary 
to impossible behaviour and consequently shares its analytical advantages — and 
also some disadvantages:
a) Explanations with the presented constraint model are generally sound and 
robust: they can only fail if one supposes that significant others do not make use of 
their power in order to defend their own interests. Typically, regressions describing 
the behavioural constraints have in terms of the adjusted r2 a higher explanatory 
power than conventional regression models.
b) Forecasts are very reliable, as they typically refer to impossible scenarios. 
However, the complementary forecasts about possible behaviour are often vague 
and imprecise. Thus, it is important to explore all constraints, e.g. not only the 
lower boundaries of possible political freedom but also the upper ones, which has 
not been done for this article.
c) Assessments of the relative weights of different constraints and their supporters 
are important by-products for further analyses. In strategic terms, such weights 
allow for assessment of the power gains which are necessary in order to turn less 
important groups into key players of the political game. In analytic terms, they 
help to assess the consequences from trends in the power distribution on the future 
importance of the concerned political actors.
This article illustrates the aforementioned advantages of analysing possible 
instead of real behaviour for the case of the impairment of political freedom by 
antidemocratic regimes. Because of the general nature of the key concepts, i.e. the 
power Pi of the different groups and their expectations Ei, the method of analysing 
constraints by sequential regressions can easily be applied to other political domains 
like social or welfare policy, as shown by the author in previous research (see 
Mueller 2003, 2006). The availability of a sufficient number of appropriate cases 
is, however, important for the successful use of the proposed methodology. Since 
the final regression equation fn(X) for the parameter estimation is calculated with 
ca. 10% of the original data points (see section 3), a lot of data are intentionally 
“wasted” so that at least 100 observations are required. Moreover, it should be 
plausible by the intentions of the analysed social actors that the mentioned 10% of 
the original values are sufficiently close to their behavioural constraints. 
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APPEndIx: GLOSSARy Of MAthEMAtICAL tERMS
bi: Parameter describing the basic expectation of group i, if F = Fmin. See 
 equation (1a). 
ci:   Parameter describing the effect of the power Pi of group i on its 
tolerance Ti (see equation (3)).
Ci:  Constraint of possible governmental policies, set by the power of group i.
Di:  Rel. deviance of the governmental policy from the expectation Ei of 
group i.
∆:	 Difference between the current freedom F and the expectation Ei about 
 freedom F+ at a future point in time.
Ei: Expectation of group i about the freedom F+ at a future point in time.
F: Freedom at the baseline time-point.
F+: Freedom at a future point in time.
F_2011:  Political freedom in 2011 = Operationalisation of F and Pnat.
F_2016:  Political freedom in 2016 = Operationalisation of F+.
Fmax: Highest possible value of F and F+, given by the operationalisations of 
 F and F+.
Fmin: Lowest possible value of F and F+, given by the operationalisations of 
 F and F+.
int: Group i = International NGOs for the promotion of political freedom.
ki:   Parameter describing the effect of the power Pi of group i on its 
tolerance Ti (see equation (3)).
max: Maximum.
nat: Group i = National civil society.
Pi: Power of group i.
Ti: Tolerance of group i with regard to deviations from its expectation Ei.
TradDep_2011: Trade dependency in 2011 = Operationalization of Pint.
nOtES
1   From equation (4) follows for any F+ on the constraint-line Ci between possible and 
impossible policies: (Ei - F+) / Ei = ki + ci * Pi. Thus (Ei - F+) = Ei * (ki + ci * Pi) and 
- (Ei - F+) = - Ei * (ki + ci * Pi). Consequently F+ = Ei - Ei * (ki + ci * Pi) = Ei * (1 - (ki + ci * Pi)) 
= Ei * (1 - ki - ci * Pi) = Ci, since F+ was assumed to be on the constraint line Ci.
2  www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017 → download “FIW 
2017 Data” → open folder “FIW2017_Data” → open EXCEL-file FH_Country_and_
Territory_Ratings_and_Statuses_1972-2016 (accessed on March 7, 2017).
3  For details of the rather complex operationalisation, see the original description of 
Freedom House in https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2018.
4  In terms of the iteratively reweighted least squares procedure, the observations with 
negative residuals are assigned the weight 0, whereas the other observations keep the 
original weight 1.
Ask. Vol. 28 (1, 2019): 43–5958
5  In classical test theory 5% is the “weakest” limiting probability for rare events, which is 
often used to reject null hypotheses.
6  Fat circular markers in this scatterplot represent multiple entries, i.e. several countries 
with identical values for F_2011 and D.
7  The parameters of the regression line in Fig. 4b are identical to the parameters of the 
model B1 in Tab. 1.
8 By definition F_2016 = 1 is the minimum possible level of political freedom.
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